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Abstract The optimal setting of public transport pricing and supply levels
has been traditionally analysed with analytical models that combine the objec-
tives of users, service providers and decision makers in optimisation problems.
In this paper, public transport fare and headway are jointly optimised using
an activity-based simulation framework. Unlike traditional analytical mod-
els that find single optimal values for headway, fare and other optimisation
variables, we obtain a range of values for the optimal fare and headway, due
to the randomness in user behaviour that is inherent to an agent-based ap-
proach. Waiting times and implications of an active bus capacity constraint
are obtained on an agent-by-agent basis. The maximisation of operator profit
or social welfare result in different combinations of the most likely optimal
headway and fare. We show that the gap between welfare and profit opti-
mal solutions is smaller when users can adjust their departure time according
to their activities, timetabling and convenience of the public transport service.
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1 Introduction
It is estimated that metropolitan areas will continue to contribute a large
proportion of a country’s economic power and will thus attract people from
rural areas. By the year 2030, more than 60 percent of the world’s popula-
tion is expected to be living in major cities.Therefore, the relevance of public
transport as a provider of accessibility to services and workplaces is expected
to grow, especially considering its role in reducing congestion and the land
consumption of the transport sector in urban areas (Nelson et al. 2007). Most
municipalities, in both developed and developing countries, need policy advice
on how to invest scarce public resources the most efficient way.
This paper is concerned with the optimal setting of public transport pricing
and supply levels in urban settings. This challenge has usually been addressed
with analytical models, which have the advantage of deriving general principles
that can be applied to different situations. Mohring (1972) developed a mi-
croeconomic model for identifying the optimal headway for a single bus route
with parametric demand, finding that bus frequency (the inverse of headway)
should increase less than proportionally with demand. The same paper intro-
duced the idea of total cost minimisation (encompassing users and operator
cost); Mohring (1972)’s model has been improved by many researchers, ac-
counting for several extensions such as differences in peak/off-peak demand
(Jansson 1980), crowding (Oldfield and Bly 1988; Kraus 1991; Jara-Dı´az and
Gschwender 2003), bus congestion and the choice of fare collection technolo-
gies (Tirachini and Hensher 2011) and the consideration of simplified networks
(Chang and Schonfeld 1991).
Elastic demand and mode choice (public vs. private transport) have also re-
ceived considerable attention in the literature. Several authors have developed
models to obtain first best and second best public transport fare and sup-
ply levels, including rules for optimal frequency and capacity of the public
transport mode (Dodgson and Topham 1987; de Borger and Wouters 1998;
Arnott and Yan 2000; Pels and Verhoef 2007; Parry and Small 2009; Ahn
2009; Jansson 2010; Basso et al. 2011; Tirachini and Hensher 2012). These
models are suitable to understand the economic principles behind the setting
of key variables such as bus frequency, transport capacity and density of lines.
However, due to their simplified nature they are less appropriate to handle
large-scale scenarios, the representation of demand is very simple (usually, a
number of passengers or trips per hour), and activity scheduling decisions (e.g.,
departure time choice) are generally not accounted for. Consequently, the re-
lationship between departure time choice by users and public transport supply
variables such as bus frequency and fare is not clearly understood. A couple
of exceptions are Kraus and Yoshida (2002) and Kraus (2003), who introduce
departure time choice for public transport users in analytical frameworks that
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borrow the highway bottleneck model of Vickrey (1969) for the modelling of
rail commuting, assuming that users arrive at stations at the same time as
trains do.
A common element of all analytical models (static and dynamic) of public
transport supply and fare setting is that unique values for fare, headway and
other optimisation variables are obtained, because these models do not account
for randomness in users decisions regarding day-to-day activity scheduling,
which in turn affects modal and departure time choices. Simulation models
in which the arrival of passengers at bus stops is random have been proposed
(e.g., Ferna´ndez and Tyler (2005); Ferna´ndez (2010); Baskaran and Krishna-
iah (2012)); these models are concerned with analysing the performance of the
bus service but are not meant to determine the effect of supply decisions on
demand, because the latter is insensitive to the quality of service and the pos-
sibility of switching departure time is not considered. A change of bus headway
and/or fare does have an impact on the decisions of users, who may replan
their whole plan for a day (including transport, work and leisure activities) to
adapt to the new scenario. For example, a general reduction in bus fare may
push a bus passenger to switch from a peak to an off-peak period if, due to
the fare reduction, buses get crowded on the peak and the user needs to wait
a long time to be able to board a bus.
In this paper, we analyse optimal public transport service provision using
the open-source activity-based microsimulation model MATSim1. An activity-
based simulation approach is well suited for a more realistic representation of
both, demand (by allowing users to adapt their activity schedules) and sup-
ply (by using the user-by-user dynamic congestion approach embedded in the
agent-based MATSim framework). At the same time, the simulation is easy
to use; without changing the framework, a scenario can be set up and the
simulation can be run. Complex behaviour emerges from simple rules that are
easy to understand. Furthermore, the approach is suitable to simulate several
scenarios assuming randomness in transport related decisions by users, with
the objective of analysing the sensitivity of optimal levels of public transport
fare and supply to such randomness.
Unlike analytical models, the activity-based simulation approach allows for an
increased level of detail and complexity, and is still easy to use. The maximi-
sation of social welfare and operator profit are studied in a framework that
integrates departure time choice and modal choice. Bus headway and fare are
jointly optimised using a parametric approach. The cases in which users can
and cannot adapt departure times to changes introduced by the public trans-
port provider are separately analysed. We consider that the limited capacity of
buses increases waiting time if a passenger cannot board a full bus; the agent-
based nature of our model allows us to identify the exact time in which each
passenger boards a bus. Dwell times increase with the number of passengers
boarding and alighting.
Randomness in user behaviour is inherent to the applied simulation approach.
1 Multi-Agent Transport Simulation, see www.matsim.org
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Therefore, in this paper, the impact of randomness on the results is analysed.
Running the simulation with several initial random seeds leads to a range
of possible values for the optimal fare and headway when maximising social
welfare, with a more likely optimal solution given by the average welfare.
This range or interval of potential welfare maximising fares and headways is
in contrast of traditional analytical models that find single optimal values for
headway, fare and other optimisation variables, and require sensitivity analysis
to explore the stability of the solution. If this finding holds when the simula-
tion is run over a real world network, and depending on the characteristics of
the the social welfare function around the optimum, the obtained interval can
give decision makers the opportunity to decide on fares and headways within a
specific range. Therefore, the potential of this approach is that other possible
objectives can be included, such as to maximise public transport demand, or
to reduce the subsidy to the operation of the public transport service. The
maximisation of operator profit and social welfare result in different combina-
tions of the optimal headway and fare (average over several random seeds), as
previously found in some microeconomic models (e.g., Chang and Schonfeld
(1991); Pels and Verhoef (2007); Ahn (2009)). The novelty of our approach is
that it shows how the gap between welfare and profit maximising headways
and fares is smaller when commuters can adjust their departure time. Without
departure time choice the alternative car mode is increasingly congested which
results in a lower price elasticity of public transport demand.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec. 2 describes the agent-
based microsimulation framework, including an overview of public transport
modelling. In Sec. 3 the test scenario is described along with the modelling
approach and all relevant assumptions. Results are presented and discussed in
Sec. 4. Finally, Sec. 5 summarises the main findings and contributions of this
paper and provides venues for further research.
2 Methodology
This section (i) gives a brief overview of the general simulation approach of
MATSim and (ii) shortly describes special characteristics of the public trans-
port simulation. For in-depth information of the simulation framework MAT-
Sim see Raney and Nagel (2006).
2.1 MATSim Overview
In MATSim, each traveler of the real system is modelled as an individual
agent. The approach consists of an iterative loop that has the following steps:
1. Plans generation: All agents independently generate daily plans that
encode among other things their desired activities during a typical day as
well as the transport mode for every intervening trip.
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2. Traffic flow simulation: All selected plans are simultaneously executed
in the simulation of the physical system. The traffic flow simulation is
implemented as a queue simulation, where each road segment (= link) is
represented as a first-in first-out queue with two restrictions (Gawron 1998;
Cetin et al. 2003): First, each agent has to remain for a certain time on
the link, corresponding to the free speed travel time. Second, a link storage
capacity is defined which limits the number of vehicles on the link; if it is
filled up, no more agents can enter this link.
3. Evaluating plans: All executed plans are evaluated by a utility function
which in this paper encodes the perception of travel time and monetary
costs for car and bus. For bus, the utility function also accounts for waiting,
access, and egress times.
4. Learning: Some agents obtain new plans for the next iteration by modi-
fying copies of existing plans. This modification is done by several strategy
modules that correspond to the available choice dimensions. In the present
paper, agents can switch between the modes car and bus. In the model
with time choice, agents can additionally adapt their departure times. The
choice between different plans is performed with respect to a multinomial
logit model. As the number of plans is limited for every agent by memory
constraints, the plan with the worst performance is discarded when a new
plan is added to a person which already has the maximum number of plans
permitted.
The repetition of the iteration cycle coupled with the agent database enables
the agents to improve their plans over many iterations. This is why it is also
called learning mechanism. The iteration cycle continues until the system has
reached an approximate stochastic user equilibrium. At this point, there is no
quantitative measure of when the system has reached that relaxed state; we
just allow the cycle to continue until the outcome is stable.
The iterative loop described above requires a random seed that has to be pro-
vided as an input variable. Based on this random seed every iteration a new
random seed is generated which is used for drawing (pseudo-)random numbers.
Each iteration these numbers determine (a) if an agent is meant to obtain a
new plan, (b) which plan is supposed to be modified and executed, (c) how a
strategy module modifies a plan (e.g., which activity is to be rescheduled and
how the departure time is shifted) and (d) if no plan is modified which plan is
individually selected and executed (according to the multinomial logit model
probabilities). That means randomness is of great importance when choice sets
are generated and when choosing among the options in the choice set. As the
entire generated randomness (the sequence of random drawings) depends on
the initial random seed, results can be reproduced. The stochastic error terms
are fixed and therefore different outcomes before and after introducing a policy
measure (e.g., increasing the headway) can only be the result of the measure
itself (Horni et al. 2011, 2012).
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2.2 Public Transport in MATSim
In MATSim, a transit schedule provides all planned public transport opera-
tions. Actual vehicle departures may differ from the schedule as transit ve-
hicles are simulated in the traffic flow simulation and interact with boarding
and alighting passengers. Depending on the vehicle type each passenger can
delay the transit vehicle. In this study, passengers are boarding and alighting
simultaneously at different doors. Thus, the total vehicle delay is defined by
the maximum of the total boarding delay and the total alighting delay. A ve-
hicle fully loaded cannot pick up any more passengers, in that case passengers
will have to wait for the next vehicle to arrive. Vehicles of one line can serve
different tours. Consequently, the delay of one vehicle can be transferred to the
following tour. In the case of a delay, the driver will try to follow the schedule
by shortening dwell times (if no person wants to alight or board) as well as
slack times. MATSim’s public transport simulation also allows for private cars
and buses competing for the same limited road capacity. Each stop can be
configured to either block traffic or to allow overtaking whenever a bus stops.
However, in this study, we do not assume a mixed-traffic operation, thus, tran-
sit vehicles are not affected by traffic congestion. For an in-depth description
of MATSim’s public transport dynamics refer to Neumann and Nagel (2010)
and Rieser (2010).
3 Scenario: Multi-Modal Corridor
3.1 Setup
Supply The interaction of supply and demand is modelled for a multi-modal
corridor with a total length of 20 km. From 4 a.m. until midnight, the corridor
is served by a constant number of identical buses that are operated by a single
company. Transit stops are located at a regular distance of 500 m along the
corridor. Access and egress times result from a walk speed of 4 km/h and the
distances between transit stop and activity location. A free speed of 30 km/h,
a minimum dwell time of 10 sec at each transit stop, and a slack time of 5 min
when reaching a corridor endpoint amounts to a cycle time of 1 h 43 min.
Actual cycle times and headways can differ from the schedule when demand is
high due to vehicle-passenger interactions. Passengers are assumed to be able
to alight and board at the same time (see Sec. 2.2). Boarding time is set to
2 sec per person (obtained with a boarding system with contactless card fare
payment, (Wright and Hook 2007)) and alighting times to 1.5 sec per person.
As described in Sec. 2.2, the transit driver will try to follow the schedule by
shortening the fixed component of dwell times (if no one wants to board or
alight), as well as slack times. In this study, the scheduled slack time at the
terminus is sufficient high to compensate for the remaining delay. Therefore,
delays are not propagated from one tour to another.
We assume that the road has two lanes per direction, with buses running on
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a separate bus lane, therefore they are not affected by traffic congestion. Car
travel times are subject to dynamic congestion. The flow capacity of a lane is
1,000 pcu/h (pcu: passenger car unit), equivalent to assuming a saturation flow
of 2,000 pcu/h and and effective green time ratio of 50 percent in a signalised
intersection.
Demand Activity patterns for a total of 20,000 travelers are considered with
a random distribution of activity locations along the corridor. Two types of
activity patterns are considered, defined by trip purpose: “Home-Work-Home”,
which is assumed to represent 35% of total trips, and “Home-Other-Home”,
which accounts for 65% of trips. In this study, these activity patterns are
fixed, that is, the agents neither change their activity types nor their order of
activities. Regarding departure time adaptation, two possibilities are modelled:
– No departure time adaptation (NDTA). Agents have the initially given
departure times and a fixed activity schedule.
– Total departure time adaptation (TDTA). Agents can adjust their depar-
ture times according to activity specific constraints. Activity types “Work”
and “Other” have defined opening times, whereas “Home” can always be
performed. As commuters and non-commuters are assumed to have wide
time spans of arrival, activity schedules are flexible (see Tab. 1).
Different distributions are assumed for the departure time of work and non-
work trips. Initial departure times from activity “Home” to “Work” follow
a normal distribution with mean at 8 a.m. and a standard deviation of 1 h.
Agents are assumed to head back home 8 h after starting work. The activity
type “Other” has a duration of 2 h and is uniformly distributed from 8 a.m.
to 8 p.m. This is a desired departure time distribution in the TDTA case,
in which users can change departure times to avoid congestion. Initial modal
split for all trips is 50% car and 50% bus. The overlay of peak and off-peak
demand (both activity patterns) is shown in Fig. 1.
The agents’ activity schedules described above are of synthetic nature. How-
ever, trip purposes (commuters vs. non-commuters), activity durations and
activity opening and closing times are chosen to reflect trip distributions that
can be found in reality (Fig. 1). The motivation is to create a simple test
scenario with enough complexity to study the issue of public transport supply
optimisation with an activity-based simulation approach.
3.2 Simulation Approach
3.2.1 Users
Choice Dimensions For the mental layer within MATSim which describes the
behavioural learning of agents, a simple utility based approach is used. When
choosing between different options with respect to a multinomial logit model,
agents are allowed to adjust their behaviour among the following choice di-
mensions:
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Fig. 1: Initial departure time distribution
– Mode choice allows to choose the mode of transport for a sub-tour within
an agent’s daily plan. Agents can switch from car to public transport or
the other way around. In this paper it is assumed that every agent has a
car available.
– Time choice allows to adapt departure times in order to shift, extend
or shorten activity durations with respect to activity specific attributes
described in the following paragraph (TDTA case only).
Utility Functions The total utility (deterministic part) that an executed plan
gets is the sum of individual contributions:
Vp =
n∑
i=1
(
Vperf ,i + Vtr ,i
)
, (1)
where Vp is the total utility for a given plan; n is the number of activities; Vperf ,i
is the (positive) utility earned for performing activity i; and Vtr ,i is the (usually
negative) utility earned for traveling to activity i. Activities are assumed to
wrap around the 24-hours-period, that is, the first and the last activity are
stitched together. In consequence, there are as many trips between activities as
there are activities. The functional form of the travel related utility functions
is as follows:
Vpt,i,j = βv,pt · ti,v,pt + βw,pt · ti,w,pt + βa,pt · ti,a,pt + βe,pt · ti,e,pt + βc · ci,pt
Vcar,i,j = β0 + βtr,car · ti,tr,car + βc · ci,car ,
(2)
where V is the systematic part of utility for person j on her trip to activ-
ity i. It is computed in “utils” and in the present paper mode dependent as
indicated by the indices car and pt. The travel time (ti,tr,car) and monetary
distance costs (ci,car) are considered as attributes of a car trip to activity i.
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For public transport trips in-vehicle time (ti,v,pt), waiting time (ti,w,pt), access
time (ti,a,pt), egress time (ti,e,pt) and monetary costs (ci,pt) are considered.
A logarithmic form is used for the positive utility earned by performing an
activity (Charypar and Nagel 2005; Kickho¨fer et al. 2011):
Vperf ,i(tperf ,i) = βperf · t∗,i · ln
(
tperf ,i
t0,i
)
, (3)
where tperf is the actual performed duration of the activity, t∗ is the “typical”
duration of an activity, and βperf is the marginal utility of an activity at its
typical duration. βperf is the same for all activities, since in equilibrium all
activities at their typical duration need to have the same marginal utility. t0,i
is a scaling parameter that is related both to the minimum duration and to the
importance of an activity. As long as dropping activities from the plan is not
allowed, t0,i has essentially no effect. Activities only can be performed within
certain time slots. Thus, agents that arrive early and wait for the activity
location to open are penalised by the opportunity costs of time −βperf .
Table 1: Activity attributes
Activity Typical Duration Opening Time Closing Time
Home 12 h undefined undefined
Work 8 h 6 a.m. 8 p.m.
Other 2 h 8 a.m. 8 p.m.
Parameters Behavioural parameters for the utility function are based on an
Australian study by Tirachini et al. (2014). Estimated parameters2 and Values
of Travel Time Savings (VTTS) are depicted in Tab. 2. The estimated value
for βe,pt yields a VTTS for egress of $53.23 which is implausible high. Since
egress times are — in the present scenario — constant, βe,pt is set to be
equal to the access time parameter βa,pt. Splitting the time related parameters
into opportunity costs of time and an additional mode specific disutility of
traveling Kickho¨fer et al. (2011, 2012, in press), leads to the parameters in
Tab. 3 which match the MATSim framework. While car users in reality have
to find a parking lot and also need to walk from the parking lot to the desired
activity location, in the model they can directly enter and leave their vehicles
at the activity location and immediately start an activity. To compensate for
a to attractive car mode the alternative specific constant β0 for car was re-
calibrated for the synthetic corridor scenario. An urban scenario is assumed in
which a modal split of around 50% : 50% between car and bus is obtained if
the bus service is provided with 6 min 26 sec headway and a fare of $1.50 (see
later on in Fig. 3b). The outcome of the calibration process is an alternative
specific constant for car of β0 = −0.15. ci,car is calculated for every trip by
2 Estimated parameters are in this paper flagged by a hat.
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Table 2: Parameters and VTTS
taken from Tirachini et al. (2014)
βˆtr,car −0.96 [utils/h]
βˆv,pt −1.14 [utils/h]
βˆw,pt −1.056 [utils/h]
βˆa,pt −0.96 [utils/h]
βˆe,pt −3.3 [utils/h]
βˆc −0.062 [utils/$a ]
βˆperf n.a. [utils/h]
V TTStr,car 15.48 [$/h]
V TTSv,pt 18.39 [$/h]
V TTSw,pt 17.03 [$/h]
V TTSa,pt 15.48 [$/h]
V TTSe,pt 53.23 [$/h]
a $ is Australian Dollar (AUD),
AUD 1.00 = EUR 0.69 (July 2014).
Table 3: Adjusted parameters and
VTTS used in the present paper
βtr,car 0 [utils/h]
βv,pt −0.18 [utils/h]
βw,pt −0.096 [utils/h]
βa,pt 0 [utils/h]
βe,pt 0 [utils/h]
βc −0.062 [utils/$]
βperf +0.96 [utils/h]
V TTStr,car 15.48 [$/h]
V TTSv,pt 18.39 [$/h]
V TTSw,pt 17.03 [$/h]
V TTSa,pt 15.48 [$/h]
V TTSe,pt 15.48 [$/h]
multiplying the distance between the locations of activity i − 1 and i by a
distance cost rate of 0.40 $/km. ci,pt is the fare which is a flat fee that has to
be paid every time an agent is boarding a bus.
3.2.2 Operator’s Profit and Social Welfare
Total operator cost (C) is calculated as equation (4):
C = (vkm · cvkm + vh · cvh) ·O + vNr · cvday , (4)
In equation (4), C is divided into three categories: vehicle kilometers (vkm),
vehicle hours (vh) and an overhead (O) including operating costs which are
not covered in the other categories. Capital costs for vehicles result from the
number of vehicles (vNr) engaged per day and equivalent daily capital costs
(cvday). Unit costs per vkm (cvkm), unit costs per vh (cvh), the overhead
and capital costs are based on estimations by ATC (2006) for urban regions
in Australia. Unit costs per vkm and capital costs depend on the capacity
(seats and standing room); a linear regression analysis yields cost functions
implying capital costs between 54 and 199 $/day and unit costs between 0.62
and 1.13 $/vkm. The number of public transport trips per day (Tpt) multiplied
by a constant fare (f) leads to daily operator’s revenues. Hence, operator’s
profit per day (Πoperator) can be described as follows:
Πoperator = Tpt · f − C (5)
User benefits are calculated as logsum term or Expected Maximum Utility
(EMU) for all choice sets of the users. Social welfare W is measured as the
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sum of operator profit and user benefits per day:
W = Πoperator +
J∑
j=1
(
1
|βc| ln
P∑
p=1
eVp
)
, (6)
where βc is the cost related parameter of the multinomial logit model or the
negative marginal utility of money, J is the number of agents in the population,
P is the number of plans or alternatives of individual j, and Vp is the systematic
part of utility of alternative (= plan) p.
Table 4: Unit costs and cost functions from ATC (2006)
cvkm 0.006 · capacity + 0.513 [$/vkm]
cvDay 1.6064 · capacity + 22.622 [$/vday]
cvh 33 [$/vh]
O 1.21
3.2.3 Simulation Procedure
A grid search is implemented for the optimisation of bus headway and fare.
The iterative loop described in Sec. 2.1 is now embedded into two external
loops. In one iteration of external loop 1, fare is kept constant while loop 2
varies the headway. The result is that the constant fare is simulated with ev-
ery headway of the search space. Then fare is changed in external loop 1, and
again simulated with every headway. Independently of headway or fare, the
same initial plans are used as input for the internal loop. Here, agents execute
their plans simultaneously in the physical environment, evaluate plans accord-
ing to the utility functions described in Sec. 3.2.1, and modify these plans
depending on the available choice dimensions. For the relaxation process de-
scribed in Sec. 2.1 a total of 300 internal iterations are run, the maximum
number of plans per agent is set to 6 and a plan is modified by each strategy
module (mode/time choice) with a probability of 10%. After 250 internal it-
erations the agents are assumed to have a plausible number of different plans
in their choice set. Therefore experimental replanning is switched off at this
point. For the last 50 iterations agents only chose among their existing plans
with respect to a multinomial logit model. The last internal iteration is used
for welfare and operator profit calculations as well as for further analyses.
Considering the inherent randomness of user decisions and to perform variabil-
ity analyses, the described simulation process is repeated for different random
seeds (see Sec. 2.1). The output parameters (e.g., mode shares, welfare, oper-
ator profit) of different random seed runs are then compared and averaged for
each combination of headway and fare.
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4 Results and Discussion
4.1 The Influence of Departure Time Choice
In this section we compare the influence of departure time choice on optimal
supply parameters. Buses are not affected by congestion on the road. However,
the capacity of buses is fixed to 60 passengers per bus, therefore, the bus mode
has a binding capacity constraint. In the joint optimisation process headways
are varied from 51 min 30 sec to 1 min 27 sec by increasing the number of buses.
Fares are varied from $0 to $5.00 in steps of $0.25. This grid search process
is repeated for 10 different random seeds. Results are given as averages over
all simulation runs with different random seeds, unless otherwise indicated.
In the model without departure time adaptation (NDTA) the only possible
user reaction to a change in supply is mode choice. In the model with total
departure time adaptation (TDTA) users can additionally react by shifting
departure times.
4.1.1 Mode Choice
Fig. 3 depicts the trip share of bus for each combination of headway and fare.
In Fig. 3a, the bus modal share is about 50% (line marked 0.5 in Fig. 3a) from
a headway of 8 min 35 sec and a fare of $0 up to 1 min 27 sec and $1.50. On
the other hand, for the TDTA model, the line marked 0.5 in Fig. 3b is shifted
towards the top-left corner, with different combinations of headway and fare:
from 11 min 26 sec and $0 up to 1 min 27 sec and $2.00. In other words,
public transport is more attractive when users have flexibility to adjust their
departure times. However, for higher fares and larger headways resulting in
lower trip shares of bus (e.g., 5%) the opposite effect occurs. The line marked
Agent-based optimisation of public transport supply and pricing 13
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Fig. 3: Trip share of bus (average of all random seed runs)
0.05 is shifted to the bottom-right corner (towards lower fares and shorter
headways), indicating that the bus mode is less attractive in the TDTA model.
The reason for the latter effect, occurring for a high number of car users, is a
more attractive car mode in the TDTA model compared to the NDTA model.
In the TDTA model, congested roads are avoided by shifting departure times,
but without departure time choice switching to bus is the only way to prevent
from being slowed down in a bottleneck. Therefore the bus mode seems to be
more attractive in the NDTA model. This effect is emphasised when calculating
road congestion for the two models: For the NDTA model, average relative car
travel time delays 3 range from 0.05% up to 28%. In contrast, the TDTA model
only yields average car travel time delays between 0.006% and 2%.
4.1.2 Operator Profit and Social Welfare
Fig. 4 shows the operator profit. In the TDTA model the maximum is within
the search space, whereas in the NDTA model the operator profit increases
further for larger headways and higher fares that are not investigated (towards
the top-left corner).
As expected, in the NDTA model operator profit is positively influenced by
headway-fare combinations where car congestion occurs. This is due to the
fact that more users accept higher fares and larger headways in order to
avoid car congestion. As indicated by the “0”-line in Fig. 4a, break-even fare-
headway combinations for the NDTA model range from $4.00 and a headway
of 51 min 30 sec over $3.50 and 34 min 20 sec to $5.00 and 14 min 42 sec.
Global profit maxima are found in the regions between $4.50 and $5.00 and
3 Relative car travel time delays are measured as the ratio between car travel time delay
(actual travel time minus free-flow travel time) and total car travel time (average of all car
trips and average of all random seeds).
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Fig. 4: Operator profit in $1,000 (average of all random seed runs)
between a headway of 34 min 20 sec and 25 min 45 sec. The optimal com-
bination of headway and fare for the average profit of all random seeds is
equal to the parameters identified for most of the random seeds: $5.00 and a
headway of 25 min 45 sec yielding an average profit of $1,198 (standard de-
viation: σ = $207). As Fig. 4b shows for the TDTA model, the bus operator
realises an average profit maximum of $7,088 (σ = $137) by offering a headway
of 5 min 25 sec and charging $1.50 per trip. At this point the operator profit
maximum is found for most of the random seeds. The break-even reaches ellip-
tically from 20 min 36 sec and $1.25 over 8 min 35 sec and $0.75, 3 min 26 sec
and $1.50 to 8 min 35 sec and $2.00. Fig. 4 can be used to study the effect of
a budget constraint on maximum subsidy by restricting the search of feasible
fares and headways to those that comply with a given financial constraint. The
impact of budget constraints on the setting of public transport fares has been
studied by Tabuchi (1993), Ahn (2009), Jara-Dı´az and Gschwender (2009) and
Basso and Silva (2013), among others.
When comparing the models, two effects become apparent: For low road con-
gestion the operator benefits from users adapting their departure times. That
is due to a higher number of bus users for the same headway and fare. How-
ever, with heavy road congestion, the bus operator benefits when users cannot
adjust departure time, and therefore, are willing to accept longer waiting times
and a higher fare. In this case the demand is less elastic and the additional
revenues due to higher fares more than compensate for the few users that
switch to car. Hence, for the NDTA model, profit maximisation results in a
more expensive bus ticket.
Fig. 5 shows the impact of varying headway and fare on the users. Overall, user
benefit is for the TDTA model on a higher level than for the NDTA model. As
expected, in both models the user benefit increases for shorter headways and
lower fares, as the individually obtained utility increases due to lower mone-
Agent-based optimisation of public transport supply and pricing 15
tary costs and shorter travel times as well as users switching from car to bus.
Fig. 6 depicts the social welfare as the sum of user benefits and operator
profit, obtained for each parameter combination (average of all random seeds);
Fig. 7 shows the standard deviation for each headway and fare. In the TDTA
model, the welfare level is above that of the NDTA model. A maximum of
$8,447,645 for the NDTA model is found for a fare of $0.50 and a headway of
4 min 28 sec (average of all random seeds, σ = $76). At this point the global
maximum is found in most of the runs. Shorter headways above the welfare
maximum reduce the operator profit to a larger extent than users benefit from
shorter waiting times. In the TDTA model, the same fare but a headway of
3 min 26 sec is found to be welfare maximising yielding a social welfare of
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Fig. 5: User benefits in $1,000 (average of all random seed runs)
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Fig. 6: Social welfare in $1,000 (average of all random seed runs)
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$8,557,438 (average of all random seeds, σ = $112). Again, in most of the runs
this combination of headway and fare is identified as a global maximum. In
both models, the standard deviation obtained for the average welfare in the
global maximum is relatively small. Whereas, for larger headways and higher
fares, especially in the NDTA model, the standard deviation is larger. In both,
the NDTA and the TDTA model, the standard deviation increases for head-
way/fare combinations with a high number of bus users that have to wait
longer due to buses working at maximum capacity (compare with Fig. 8). A
more detailed analysis of randomness is performed in Sec. 4.2.
Tab. 5 summarises the headway/fare combination for the welfare (W ) and
the operator profit (Πoperator) optimal solutions in the NDTA and the TDTA
model. It also shows the mode shares obtained for each solution (average of
all random seeds), including the standard deviation σ. Furthermore, a budget
constraint on maximum subsidy is included, e.g. the optimisation objective of
maximum social welfare subject to the constraint that the operator profit is
greater or equal $0.0. That is, we assume a maximum subsidy of $0.0 per day.
For this optimisation objective, the NDTA model leads to a headway which is
in between that of the profit and welfare maximum. In the TDTA model, both
headway and fare are situated in between the welfare and the profit optimal
solution.4
Comparing the NDTA and TDTA model, two effects are identified: On the
one hand, in Fig. 3, a 50% mode share can be achieved with a larger headway
and fare in the TDTA model than in the NDTA model. That is, the ability
to reschedule departure times compensates for a larger headway and a higher
4 If not otherwise specified, welfare optimal or welfare maximum refer to the unconstraint
situation which also allows for the operator to make losses.
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Fig. 7: Standard deviation of average social welfare in $
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Table 5: Optimal solutions (average of all random seeds)
NDTA model TDTA model
Max(W ) Headway: 4 min 28 sec
Fare: $0.5
Bus share: 72.48% (σ = 0.17%)
Headway: 3 min 26 sec
Fare: $0.5
Bus share: 93.73% (σ = 0.10%)
Max(Πoperator) Headway: 25 min 45 sec
Fare: $5.0
Bus share: 3.38% (σ = 0.10%)
Headway: 5 min 25 sec
Fare: $1.5
Bus share: 55.55% (σ = 0.23%)
Max(W )
Πoperator ≥ 0
Headway: 17 min 10 sec
Fare: $5.0
Bus share: 4.37% (σ = 0.11%)
Headway: 4 min 28 sec
Fare: $1.0
Bus share: 81.36% (σ = 0.27%)
fare. On the other hand, if we start in the NDTA global optimum and allow
departure time adaptation, the bus mode becomes relatively more attractive
(see Tab. 5). Capacity constraints lead to an increase in the number of trips
missing at least one bus (see Fig. 8b). Consequently, decreasing headway will
increase welfare. At a fare of $0.50 and a headway of 3 min 26 sec, no more
buses will be missed. This is also the global welfare maximum (Fig. 6b).
Comparing the global welfare and profit maxima, it is evident that operator
profit and social welfare maximisation processes result in different combina-
tions of optimal headway and fare, as previously found in several microeco-
nomic models (e.g., Chang and Schonfeld (1991); Pels and Verhoef (2007); Ahn
(2009)). The novelty of our approach is that it shows how the gap between wel-
fare and profit maximising headways and fares is smaller when users can adjust
their departure time. As described above, without departure time choice the
alternative car mode is increasingly congested which results in a lower price
elasticity of public transport demand. Furthermore, for headway-fare combi-
nations around the welfare maximum the number of bus users is higher in
the TDTA model, meaning that with departure time choice the bus service is
more efficient. Thus, the operator and the users benefit from departure time
adaptation.
4.1.3 Constrained Bus Capacity and Optimal Pricing
Assuming a separated bus lane, buses are not delayed by road congestion.
However, public transport users are subject to three types of congestion ef-
fects: First, a bus is delayed due to transfers: if more than 5 agents board
or more than 7 agents alight at a transit stop the scheduled dwell time is ex-
ceeded. As a consequence other passengers are affected due to longer in-vehicle
times. Once a bus is fully loaded, it will not be further delayed. Second, as in
each external iteration the number of buses is fixed, an increase in dwell time
at stops due to a large number of passengers boarding and/or alighting also
increases the actual bus headway, on top of the scheduled headway. There-
fore, the average cost of waiting times increases. Third, if buses are working
at maximum capacity, users cannot board and thus have to wait for a later
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bus, further increasing waiting time.
These effects explain why for some levels of supply, welfare maximising fares
higher than $0 are found. Increasing the fare from $0 up until the welfare
maximum causes users switching from bus to car. On the one hand, the ben-
efit of bus users is decreased which is compensated by an increased operator
revenue of same amount (transfer payment). On the other hand, social welfare
is increased due to users switching from bus to car when they produce less
congestion or delay costs. In the NDTA model, car congestion is significantly
higher than in the TDTA model resulting in longer travel times within the
car mode, mainly for large headways and high fares. Therefore switching to
car generates less utility for travelers. Since both modes are working at max-
imum capacity the opportunities of increasing the social welfare by pricing
are reduced. For headways of 20 min 36 sec or larger a welfare optimal fare
of $0 is found. Reducing car congestion by shortening bus headway steeply
raises social welfare (see Fig. 6a). Finally, for shorter headways the optimal
fare is above $0. Reduced travel times within the bus mode overcompensate
for higher road congestion due to users switching from bus to car.
In this study, bus bunching is not observed to be significant, e.g. buses do not
stick to each other or overtake each other. The main reasons for this are: First,
buses are not allowed to depart before the scheduled departure time (they can
only be delayed). Second, for short scheduled headways, the load factors are
lower and buses are also delayed to a lower extent. Whereas, for large head-
ways, load factors are higher and buses are increasingly delayed. However, this
applies to all buses and the corridor is not long enough to result in buses falling
that much behind the schedule to cause bus bunching. Third, the demand is
equally distributed along the corridor. Forth, the share of the peak demand is
relatively small. For an analysis of bus bunching with MATSim, see Neumann
and Nagel (2010).
Next, we analyse the effects of a binding bus capacity constraint. Assuming
randomly distributed activity locations along the corridor, waiting times due
to full buses are longer for passengers boarding at the middle of the corri-
dor. Load factors at the beginning and end of the corridor are lower, thus not
yielding boarding denials. The number of missed bus trips, depicted in Fig. 8,
indicates if buses are working at maximum capacity (some users have to wait
for a later bus). In the NDTA model a high number of missed bus trips is found
for fares below $1.00 with headways between 9 min 21 sec and 1 min 27 sec. As
Fig. 8b shows for the TDTA model, fares below $2.00 combined with headways
between 17 min 10 sec and 3 min 26 sec make the bus mode so attractive that
some users are even willing to miss a bus. Short headways reduce the number
of passengers per bus, and therefore the number of trips with waiting times
larger than one headway is reduced. Increasing the fare for a public transport
supply with fully loaded buses leads to less users taking the bus and thereby
decreases the number of missed bus trips. Finally, when buses are not working
at maximum capacity, either a fare of $0 is found to be welfare maximising
or the welfare function is almost flat for fares between $0 and the optimum.
A zero optimal fare means that there is no marginal cost (on top of the av-
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erage user cost) attached to carrying an extra passenger, something that is
not longer valid when the bus capacity constraint is binding (see discussion in
Tirachini and Hensher (2012)).
4.1.4 Departure Time Choice and Peak Spreading
Since waiting times seem to have a major impact on the overall welfare level
as well as on the optimal combination of fare and headway, a more detailed
analysis of differences between the NDTA and TDTA models is conducted.
This provides us with insights into the effects of departure time adaptation to
the schedule and peak spreading. In the TDTA model, non-commuters as well
as commuters can freely choose their arrival time within a wide time span,
therefore, departure times are adjusted to avoid peak periods. Fig. 9 depicts
the final time distribution for a headway of 34 min 20 sec and a fare of $1.00
in the NDTA and the TDTA model. When enabling departure time choice,
users disperse around the commuter peaks for two reasons: to maximise their
positive utility gained from performing activities and to minimise travel re-
lated costs. For example, users benefit from taking the bus at off-peak times.
Defining short time windows for arrival at work and an extra penalty for arriv-
ing late would have the effect that the activity work has a stronger impact on
travel decisions (mode and departure time choice). For example, driving may
become more attractive especially if the bus headway is long. Secondly, soft
time restrictions in the TDTA model allow users to adapt departure times in
order to avoid peak congestion within the bus mode. By adapting departure
times, extra waiting times due to fully loaded buses are avoided. Furthermore,
long in-vehicle times caused by extended boarding and alighting of other pas-
sengers are avoided by departing at off-peak times.
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Fig. 8: Number of trips missing at least one bus (average of all random seeds)
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Fig. 9: Final departure time distribution (headway: 34 min 20 sec; fare: $1.00)
4.2 Simulation randomness
In the previous section, optimal fares and headways are obtained by averag-
ing operator profit and social welfare over 10 random seeds of the simulation
model. Fig. 7 depicts the standard deviation of the average welfare over all
random seeds and all parameter combinations of headway and fare. There
are three effects on the standard deviation that can be observed: First, as
described in Sec. 4.1.2, the standard deviation is larger for headway/fare com-
binations where a large number of passengers cannot board the first arriving
bus due to capacity constraints (compare to Fig. 8). This is true for the NDTA
and the TDTA model. Second, in the NDTA model, the standard deviation
of social welfare is rather high for large headways and high fares. In con-
trast, for the same parameter combinations, the TDTA model shows a rather
small increase in the standard deviation. Presumably, this is due to the fact
that in the NDTA model, road congestion is higher than in the TDTA model
(see Sec. 4.1.1). Third, combining the observations of the first two effects, the
parameter combinations with high standard deviation have in common that
users more strongly compete for limited resources, e.g. road capacity or tran-
sit vehicles. Randomness in user behavior apparently affects welfare levels of
other users rather strongly when resources are scarce. In some situations, the
random choice behavior might lead to an efficient use of capacities. In other
situations, it might lead to a less efficient use of capacities. This effect is then
reflected in a higher standard deviation of social welfare.
The procedure of averaging multiple runs is implemented because we found
that different random seeds could result in different combinations of fare and
headway that maximise profit and welfare. To illustrate this point, Fig. 10
shows the welfare obtained with three different seeds for a range of fares be-
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Fig. 10: Randomness in maximum social welfare
tween $0.25 and $1.75, for a fixed fleet size of three buses. Run 1 reaches a
maximum at a fare of $1.00. With Run 2 an almost identical welfare level is
obtained for fares of $0.75, $1.00 and $1.25, whereas Run 3 reaches a max-
imum at $0.75 but it also shows a local maximum at $1.25. However, when
computing the average (over 10 runs), it points to a single maximum at $0.75.
Randomness in user behaviour analysed by simulating different random seeds
also plays an important role when obtaining the global social welfare max-
imum, as both optimal fare and headway are sensitive to the random seed
chosen. Fig. 11 depicts the number of runs for a total of 50 random seeds in
which a particular headway-fare combination is found to maximise welfare for
the TDTA model. The total height of a bar indicates for how many random
seeds the respective fare is found to be welfare maximising. The colours in
each bar indicate for which headway this applies. In the grid search imple-
mented, only two headways are found to maximise welfare of individual seeds,
either 3 min 40 sec (28 buses) or 4 min 07 sec (25 buses). Therefore, we can
suggest that the actual optimal headway is likely to be in the range between
3 min 30 sec and 4 min 30 sec. Nevertheless, the range of fares that max-
imises social welfare for each individual seed is wider, with a likely optimal
fare between $0.4 and $0.7. The most repeated optimal fare is $0.6 which was
obtained 30% of times (15 out of 50 seeds, 9 times with 28 buses and 6 times
with 25 buses), followed by $0.4 obtained 26% of times, and $0.7 obtained
24% of times. This is an indication that the social welfare function is quite flat
around the optimal fare, as shown in Fig. 12, in which results from all 50 seeds
are averaged. Figures 11 and 12 suggest that, from a policy perspective, there
is scope for other considerations to be taken when deciding the actual fare to
be applied within the range $0.4 to $0.7, as social welfare is practically insen-
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Fig. 12: Social welfare, average over 50 seeds, TDTA model
sitive to any fare on that range (for example, a fare of $0.4 increases public
transport demand, a fare of $0.7 reduces the subsidy required to operate the
public transport service).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, public transport fare and headway were jointly optimised using
an activity-based simulation framework with the objective of maximising op-
erator profit and social welfare (with and without the constraint of maximum
subsidy). We simulated the interaction between users — who choose mode
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and departure time according to their activities, timetabling and convenience
of the public transport service — and a public transport service provider.
Apart from mode choice (travel alternatives are car and bus), we compared
the cases in which commuters and non-commuters can adjust departure time
as a reaction to changes in bus fare and headway, against the most commonly
analysed case in which only mode choice is available (i.e., activity scheduling
is fixed). Because the activity patterns of each agent was simulated, relevant
implications of public transport supply levels such as waiting times and im-
plications of an active bus capacity constraint were analysed in detail on an
agent-by-agent basis. The model was applied to a single bimodal corridor us-
ing a demand model and operator cost data from Australia.
The main results of this paper are summarised next. First, unlike traditional
analytical models that find single optimal values for decision variables such
as bus headway and fare, we obtained a range of values for the optimisa-
tion variables due to the randomness in user behaviour that is inherent to
our simulation framework. Second, as previously shown in the microeconomic
literature of public transport, the maximisation of operator profit and social
welfare result in different combinations of (the most likely) optimal headway
and fare, and our approach showed that the gap between welfare and profit
optimal solutions is smaller when users can adjust their departure time. This
is because when users have a fixed activity schedule and cannot adjust depar-
ture times, the alternative car mode is increasingly congested, mainly in the
peak period, which results in a less elastic public transport demand to price
and headway. In addition to that, for parameter ranges around the welfare
maximum, departure time choice yields a higher number of bus users. Thus,
both, the operator and the users, benefit from departure time adaptation.
Third, analysing the impact of departure time choice, two effects are observed:
On the one hand, the ability to reschedule departure times compensates for
a larger headway and a higher fare. Enabling departure time choice lets users
adapt their departure times according to the bus schedule and on a wider
range in order to avoid congestion on the road and on the bus mode (peak
spreading), the latter is primarily observed when the bus capacity is reached
and waiting times increase due to missed buses. Due to this effect welfare max-
imising headway and fare are greater when users have the freedom to adjust
departure time relative to the case in which their schedules are fixed. On the
other hand, the ability to reschedule departure times yields a higher number
of bus users and increases the number of trips missing at least one bus. The
latter effect shifts the welfare maximum towards a shorter headway relative to
the case in which schedules are fixed and bus demand is lower. We provided
an in-depth examination of waiting times and bus capacity constraints since
they have a major impact on the overall welfare level as well as on the optimal
combination of fare and headway. For combinations of headway and fare where
the bus mode is attractive enough so that some travelers risk to miss a bus,
we found the steepest slope of the welfare function. That is, the more travelers
miss a bus, the higher the possible gains by increasing the fare.
The approach presented in this paper can easily be applied to more sophisti-
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cated networks and real world scenarios. Hence, it is an easy-to-use approach
that allows to investigate how general the results are for other settings. Our
large-scale agent-based simulation model is suitable to analyse the complex in-
teractions between users and transport supply, including several alternatives
on public transport service design and road infrastructure for motorised and
unmotorised traffic in general. Importantly, the planned extension to real-
world scenarios should account for the existence of several activity types, in-
cluding more diverse work activity types with mixes of commuters with fixed
working times, short and wide time windows to work. Different mixes of restric-
tions on activity durations and start/end times should influence the optimal
design of the public transport service (optimal frequency and fare in peak and
off-peak periods) and the resulting modal split. Other promising venues of fur-
ther research are the public transport network design and the inclusion of other
sources of disutility, such as travel time variability and passenger crowding.
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